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Sitting on the fence: How the London summit exposed the inertia in
the EU’s reconciliation policy for the Western Balkans
The 2018 Western Balkans Summit was held in London on 9-10 July. As Denisa
Kostovicova explains, there was hope that the summit might officially launch a
regional fact-finding commission – RECOM – which would record the victims of
human rights violations to help aid the reconciliation process in the region.
However, even though the summit put legacy issues on the agenda, it dashed
hopes for RECOM at this stage at least, underlining the EU’s lack of a concrete
programme for addressing the crimes of the past and advancing reconciliation.
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Despite Brexit, and the paradox of a departing member state aspiring to steer the agenda of the
EU’s engagement with the Western Balkans through the German initiative called the Berlin
process, last week’s London Summit on the Western Balkans held out much hope.
This was especially the case for civil society – NGOs and associations – representing all ethnic
groups involved in the wars of Yugoslavia’s dissolution who are gathered around an initiative
advocating the establishment of a state-level regional fact-finding commission, RECOM. They
hoped that a declaration signed by the Balkan states (initially by Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro and
Macedonia, to be followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Croatia) at the London Summit
would initiate the formal process of its establishment. This did not come to pass.
Civil society activists are now left to grapple with the question of how to press on with their cause.
Their disappointment lays bare dilemmas facing not just the Summit’s host, but also the EU’s
policy towards the legacy of war crimes in the Western Balkans. The dilemma is stark given that
the closure of the Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague (ICTY) at the end of
last year, which was the lynchpin of the EU’s policy toward the criminal legacy in the region and
reconciliation, reveals the void in this policy area.
Why RECOM?
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In the run-up to the London Summit, the supporters of the RECOM initiative made a compelling
case. Civil society activists have argued for RECOM as a regional fact-finding commission that
would record the war dead and survivors of gross human rights violations and the circumstances
of their death and of their suffering. Although the facts of war crimes will always lend themselves
to different interpretations in divided post-conflict settings, establishing the facts of war crimes in
the first instance would prevent the political manipulation of the numbers of victims and advance
reconciliation efforts.
A restorative approach to justice-seeking through victims’ testimonies as opposed to through war
crimes trials would also be conducive to nourishing empathy towards the victims belonging to
another ethnic group. All ethnic groups in the Balkans understand victimhood exclusively from
their narrow ethnic perspective. Reconciliation requires recognition of the pain and suffering of
others.
Facing criticism that a regional approach to transitional justice may trump or even marginalise
national-level initiatives, the response by RECOM’s advocates was clear in that regional and
national initiatives are not incompatible. Lastly, many civil society organisations have already
begun to register war dead, demonstrating the importance of fine-grained factual accounts of
those bloody war years. Not only does the registration of victims by name and last name alongside
the circumstances of their suffering give them recognition, the pattern of killings also reveals new
knowledge about the nature and conduct of war.
But, these civil society projects lack the legitimacy that they would acquire if they were carried out
officially and regionally following an inter-state agreement and the states’ commitment to the
process; hence, the hopes for the London Summit and the beginning of the state-led fact-finding
process in the Balkans.
Why not RECOM?
If the case for the establishment of RECOM is so compelling, why didn’t the official launch of the
regional fact-finding process take place at the London Summit? The inability of RECOM’s activists
to win over the governments in the region to support the fact-finding exercise – conceivably, an
apolitical exercise – is ultimately a matter of politics. Any move in the direction of reconciliation,
however modest, is the biggest threat to elites in the Balkans. Reconciliation undermines the
credibility of nationalist rhetoric that has proved handy in diverting attention away from poor
governance, including corruption.
Montenegro’s commitment to RECOM on the eve of the London Summit shows that this needn’t
be so. In fact, reckoning with the criminal past is integral to progress in democratisation and good
governance. But the expectation that RECOM’s activists can deliver the deal, securing the
endorsement of governments which will then be rubber-stamped either at some EU-related
summit or by the EU itself, overestimates the impact of civil society on policy-making in the Balkan
context and underestimates the resistance of Balkan governments to accountability for war crimes
(including the resistance of Croatia, an EU member state).
Furthermore, this situation can be read as the unwillingness of EU member states to call out
Balkan governments on their reluctance, at best, and obstruction, at worst, in relation to dealing
with the past. Above all, the outcome of the London Summit points to the importance of the EU’s
own role in supporting efforts to overcome the criminal legacy in the Balkans. The EU’s war crimes
conditionality policy, which required cooperation with the ICTY as a condition for the countries’
progress in the process of European integration, was vehemently contested. Its effectiveness is
subject to ongoing discussion and appraisal. But, without doubt, it provided a focal point for the
debate about justice and responsibility.
Without it, it is all too evident that it is easy to sweep issues relating to justice and responsibility
under the carpet. The evidence from flawed domestic war crimes prosecutions is ample. Tolerance
of abusive nationalist rhetoric along with denigration and insults of victims of war crimes in public
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discourse is telling. The post ICTY-situation reveals the necessity of some form of external
steering and involvement to strengthen the local champions of truth, accountability and justice.
Stepping into the void
With its focus on legacy issues, the London Summit on the Western Balkans stepped into the void
after the closure of the Hague Tribunal. The signed statements on legacy issues are a contribution
to mainstreaming issues related to war crimes and human rights violations, and aim to secure the
commitment of Balkan states to working on their resolution.
The summit highlighted the important issue of those missing from the wars; it did not let the
responsibility for sexual war-time violence and combating the stigma surrounding the victims of
sexual violence slip off the agenda, and it recognised the significance of the regional approach
and cooperation for addressing the outstanding legacy issues.
In a moment of frankness, on the margins of the summit, an official from the Balkans told me of his
genuine uncertainty about which way is the right way to go about reconciliation: to leave the past
behind and move on, or to dig deep into the pain and wounds for the sake of reconciliation. The
EU’s policy, which is not unequivocally invested beyond rhetoric, and lacks a concrete programme
of action and evaluation of progress in addressing the crimes of the past and advancing
reconciliation, comes across as sitting on the fence, too.
Such a policy is also a signal for local elites that signatures do not mean much, as neither
individual EU member states nor the EU as a whole, let alone local civil groups, will or can hold
them to account. That a deep sense of injustice may fester and hurt, with implications beyond the
Balkans, is not of their concern either.
Please read our comments policy before commenting.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics
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